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INTERNATIONAL LAW BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT: A MIXED RECORD OF RECOGNITION
Jordan J. Paust*
This short article will address the use of international
law and its relevance in six cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 2004. For those familiar with its
core and contours, international law resonates through sev-
eral issues addressed by the Court. Nonetheless, members of
the Court have sometimes viewed international law only
obliquely, despite its obvious applicability and its great utility
for more than 200 years as a basis for judicial decision mak-
ing and as an interpretive aid. Sometimes there was an evi-
dent unfamiliarity with that history, and sometimes there
was just plain error-each conditioned partly, I assume, by
less than historically accurate briefing by lawyers that pro-
vided argument and advice to the Court. Several of the cases
addressing international law arose out of the George W. Bush
administration's detention of persons without trial, and it is
likely that, in the future, issues concerning criminal ill-
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo and illegalities sur-
rounding the military commissions will reach the Court.
For the first time in its history, the Court addressed the
nature and scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),1 but
its sense of history and awareness of the content of interna-
tional law and rich patterns of incorporation over the last two
centuries leave much to be desired. Indeed, the history of ju-
dicial incorporation and views of the Founders and Framers
should be revisited in any future ATCA cases as well as in
* Mike and Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston. B.A.,
J.D., UCLA; LL.M., University of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale University. ©
2005. All Rights Reserved.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This statute, also called the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." Id.
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cases implicating war crime responsibility (civil or criminal)
of present and former members of the executive branch who
eagerly planned, encouraged, and otherwise aided and abet-
ted the denial of protections and rights of other human beings
under human rights law and the laws of war.2
I. RAsu's RELEVANT RECOGNITIONS
Although the mAjority opinion of Justice Stevens in Ra-
sul v. Bush3 was based on the proper reach of the U.S. habeas
statute4 and federal court jurisdiction and was not predicated
on international law, two important issues involving interna-
tional law were raised (1) concerning the meaning of certain
terms contained in the habeas statute, such a's the word "ju-
risdiction," and phrases that cover relevant violations of cus-
tomary international law and treaties, such as "laws ... of
the United States" and "treaties of the United States," and (2)
concerning the reach of the habeas statute to all persons.
With respect to the first issue, Justice Stevens rightly recog-
nized that a 1903 international agreement with Cuba af-
firmed the existence of the "ultimate sovereignty of the Re-
public of Cuba," but also provided the United States
"complete jurisdiction and control over and within" the Guan-
tanamo area;5 that Guantanamo is thus "a territory over
which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive ju-
risdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty;"'6 and that persons
detained at Guantanamo are therefore "detained within 'the
territorial jurisdiction' of the United States,"7 although they
2. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005); Lawfulness of Detentions by the United
States at Guantanamo Bay, Eur. Parl. Ass., Res. 1433 (2005), available at
http'//assembly.coe.intMain.asp?link=http'//assembly.coe.intDouments/Adopt
edText/ta05/ERES1433.htm (last visited May 7, 2005).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). -,
4. See 28 U.S.C: § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000).
5. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91. See also Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism
Military Commissions: the Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
677, 692 (2002).
6. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
7. Id. at 2696. See also id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that
"Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory");
Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1286 n.9, 1289-30 nn. 13-14 (9th Cir. 2003);
Paust, supra note 5, at 692.
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are "outside the United States."8 These are not remarkable
recognitions concerning treaty interpretation, sovereignty,
and territorial jurisdiction, but they were correct and prop-
erly arrayed as background for purposes of statutory inter-
pretation and supporting the democratically required reach of
judicial power. These recognitions also implicate interna-
tional law, and, with respect to statutory interpretation, it is
important to note that the Supreme Court has often used
treaty-based and customary international law as necessary
background for proper interpretation of federal statutes.9
With respect to the habeas statute, which sets forth words
and phrases such as "jurisdiction" and violations of "laws ...
of the United States" and "treaties," 1 it would be all the more
appropriate to address the meaning of jurisdiction under in-
ternational law and relevant violations of customary interna-
tional law (which are laws of the United States) and treaties.
For example, what Justice Stevens recognized as U.S.
"territorial jurisdiction" at Guantanamo1 has similar mean-
ing under customary international law, since territorial juris-
dictional competencies and responsibilities can reach beyond
U.S. territory to include U.S. flag vessels,12 aircraft of U.S.
8. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
9. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120
(1933); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924); MacLeod v. United
States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 245-46 (1817); Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 47-49 n.57, 70, 99, 101,
120, 124-25 n.2, 134 n.18, 137 n.41, 143-44 n.73 (2d ed. 2003).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c)(3) (2000).
11. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
12. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953); Flores, 289
U.S. at 155-59; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 264-65 (1893); United
States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786, 787 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 14,932) (noting
that "the offence.., was committed.. . on board of a foreign schooner" and was
therefore "committed within ... [a foreign state's] territorial jurisdiction");
United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865)
(stating that "[aill vessels, whether public or private, are part of the territory
and within the jurisdiction of the nation to which they belong"); Paust, supra
note 9, at 417, 427 n.17; Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies
Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment,
Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1335, 1347-48 & n.46 (2004); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism
Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 24, 24-25 n.68
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registry,13 space stations of U.S. registry,14 war-related occu-
pied territory in Afghanistan and Iraq, 5 and territory at
Guantanamo." Moreover, the focus of the habeas statute is
on jurisdiction, despite selectively activist judges who prefer
to legislate by adding limiting words such as "sovereign bor-
ders, ' " "sovereign territory,"" or "sovereignty"0 that Congress
has not chosen and international law would not tolerate. °
Among them are judges who in other contexts prefer to apply
the well-known rule of construction that federal statutes are
to be interpreted with reference to international law.2'
International law is also relevant to an adequate inter-
pretation of other words that appear in the habeas statute.
For example, the word "treaties" that is found in the habeas
statute22 obviously implicates international law. Moreover,
various Founders, Supreme Court Justices, and other federal
(2001).
13. See, e.g., Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389, 391 (6th Cir. 1980) (constru-
ing "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" as apply-
ing to aircraft in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976)); United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp.
298, 302-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (not extending a domestic statute "to a plane in
flight over the high seas under a statute which speaks of crimes committed upon
the high seas or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States") (emphasis added); PAUST, supra note 9, at 417,
427 n.17; Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions, supra note 12, at 24-25,
25 n.69.
14. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 317.
15. See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commission, supra note 12, at 24
n.67.
16. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 692; Paust, Antiterrorism Military
Commission, supra note 12, at 25 n.70.
17. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (feigning a
desire to "leave it to Congress to change § 2241"). It is important to recognize
that habeas corpus has historically been available for U.S. and foreign persons
detained in foreign territory and on foreign vessels. See, e.g., Abu Ali v.
Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004); Paust, supra note 5, at 692, 692
n.69, and the many cases cited. But see Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tioday's opinion.., extends the habeas statute, for the first time,
to aliens beyond the sovereign territory of the United States and beyond the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of its courts.").
18. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
19. Id. at 1048-50. But see Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1286-90 & nn.9, 12 & 14
(9th Cir. 2003).
20. See infra text accompanying note 27.
21. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-15 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("An act of congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.") (quoting The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c)(3) (2000).
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judges have long recognized more generally that another
phrase that appears in the habeas statute, the phrase "laws
of the United States," encompasses the law of nations or what
we term "customary international law."23 Under treaty-based
and customary international law that is directly incorpo-
rable24 and is also executed by 5 and incorporated by refer-
ence26 through the habeas statute, the United States has an
obligation to assure meaningful and effective judicial review
of executive decisions to detain persons without trial wher-
ever it exercises control over a detained person.27 Rasul al-
lows the United States to comply with international duties
and fundamental rights of persons detained at Guantanamo
under a statute that permits habeas review with respect to
persons who claim to be detained in violation of the Constitu-
tion,28 laws, 9 or treaties"° of the United States. Considering
23. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980); District of Columbia v.
Int'l Distributing Corp., 331 F.2d 817, 820 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v.
Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297, 299 n.* (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); United States v. The
Ariadne, 24 F. Cas. 851, 856 (D.C.D. Pa. 1812) (No. 14,465); Henfield's Case, 11
F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Jay, C.J., on circuit); PAUST,
supra note 9, at 7-11, 38 n.36, 44 n.54, 50 n.60passim.
24. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 7-12 (concerning direct incorporation of
customary international law), 67-71 (concerning direct incorporation of treaties)
passim.
25. The habeas statute executes treaties for habeas purposes. See, e.g., id.
at 374, 380 n.2, 492; JORDAN J. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 194 (2000); Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Deter-
mine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 503, 517 (2003).
26. The habeas statute incorporates by reference international law for ha-
beas purposes in two ways: (1) expressly with respect to treaties of the United
States and (2) impliedly with respect to customary international law through
the phrase "laws... of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a), (c)(3). Con-
cerning incorporation by reference, see for example Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
27-30 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820);
PAUST, supra note 9, at 9, 12-14, 95-97 n.125, 373, 447-48; PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra note 25, at 143-49.
27. See, e.g., Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 507-10, 514.
28. Whether protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution reach aliens abroad and whether the president has any authority
to act inconsistently with the Constitution, here or abroad (that they do and the
president does not, see, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions, supra
note 12, at 18-20), the president has an unavoidable constitutional duty to faith-
fully execute international law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; PAUST, supra
note 9, at 7-9, 169-73, and the unanimous views of the Founders and Framers
and the many cases cited.
29. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 691 n.65 (concerning cases addressing
habeas claims based on violations of customary international legal principles
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such duties and rights under international law as background
for interpretive purposes, the interpretation of the habeas
statute in Rasul was most appropriate. As noted in a prior
writing, Supreme Court decisions assure that:
federal statutes must be interpreted consistently with in-
ternational law and, in case of an unavoidable clash be-
tween a federal statute and international law, interna-
tional law will prevail unless there is a clear and
unequivocal intent of Congress to override international
law. In this case, international law requires the availabil-
ity of habeas corpus and there is no clear and unequivocal
intent of Congress to override international law. Even if
there had been such an intent, international law concern-
ing the right to habeas corpus would prevail under either
the "rights under treaties" exception (guaranteeing the
primacy of "rights under" a treaty) or the "war powers" ex-
ception (guaranteeing the primacy of international law in
the context of war) to the "last in time" rule.3'
Moreover, Justice Stevens was clearly correct in noting
that the detainees' allegations that their detention was in vio-
lation of the law of nations and treaties of the United States,
and even actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, "un-
questionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.' 32
The second issue in Rasul implicating international law
involves fundamental treaty-based and customary rights of
equal access to courts. Despite the Bush administration's ea-
ger trampling of customary and treaty-based international
law that precludes the "denial of justice33 to aliens and pro-
vides freedom from discrimination on the basis of national or
and human rights).
30. See, e.g., id. (concerning cases addressing habeas claims based on viola-
tions of treaties).
31. Id. at 693. As writings cited therein demonstrate, each step in this in-
terpretive process and each exception to the "last in time" rule is based in Su-
preme Court decisions. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 99, 101-02, 104-07,
120, 124-25 nn.2-3. That Congress is also bound by the laws of war, see, for ex-
ample, id. at 48-49 n.57, 106-09.
32. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15.
33. PAUST, supra note 9, at 225, 286-89 n.479, 481. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711,
cmts. a, c & reporters' note 2 (3d ed. 1987) (concerning the customary interna-
tional legal prohibition of "denial of justice" to aliens); Paust, Antiterrorism
Military Commission, supra note 12, at 12 n.26, 13, n.27 (concerning the "denial
ofjustice" to aliens at Guantanamo).
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social origin,34 equal protection, 5 and equal access to courts, 36
Justice Stevens recognized that "[alliens held at the base, no
less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal
courts' authority"37 under the habeas statute that clearly pro-
vides relief for "any person."38 He noted that "courts of the
United States have traditionally been open to nonresident
aliens,"39 recognized that the ATCA "explicitly confers the
privilege of suing for an actionable 'tort ... in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States on aliens,""
and ruled that whether the detainees "are being held in mili-
tary custody is immaterial."' In this regard, Rasul allows the
United States to comply with fundamental treaty-based and
customary international law. More generally, Rasul seemed
to send a message that executive actions are not above the
law and are not unreviewable by the judiciary-a message
that is also apparent in opinions addressed in the next two
sections.
II. PADILLA'S PRESCIENT PROTESTATION
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla," by ruling that Padilla's habeas
petition was filed in the wrong federal district court, the
Court ducked significant issues concerning lawfulness of de-
tention without trial and judicial power and responsibility to
review executive decisions to detain persons in order to obtain
information from them.3 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens reaf-
firmed the overriding importance in our free and democratic
society of "the constraints imposed on the Executive by the
rule of law." While addressing the use of "[ilncommunicado
34. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 678; Paust, Antiterrorism Military Com-
mission, supra note 12, at 12-13, 17 n.37.
35. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 678; Paust, Antiterrorism Military Com-
mission, supra note 12, at 12-13, 17 n.38, 18.
36. See, e.g., Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commission, supra note 12, at
10-16; Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 504, 507-10.
37. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2000).
39. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
40. Id. at 2699.
41. Id.
42. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
43. See id. at 2711, 2715, 2727. The issues and relevant cases are addressed
in Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 503-29.
44. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For similar recogni-
tions, see, for example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
835
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
detention for months on end" as an executive-approved tactic
to obtain information from a detained person, Justice Stevens
also offered a prescient warning of relevance to supporters of
executive miscreants who attempt to justify or otherwise aid
in denials of legal protections to persons detained at Guan-
tanamo and elsewhere:
Whether the information so procured is more or less reli-
able than that acquired by more extreme forms of torture
is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain true
to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the
tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of
tyranny. 5
III. HAMDI'S HELPING HAND
Although addressing an implied congressional authoriza-
tion for detention during an armed conflict in Afghanistan,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 46
echoed part of Justice Stevens's warning in Padilla: "we agree
that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is
not authorized."47 Justice O'Connor also recognized that the
law of war authorizes certain forms of detention of certain
persons and that such law is impliedly within the scope of the
congressional authorization, but "that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities"48 and that the war in Afghani-
646, 649-50, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 219-21 (1882); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 119-21 (1866); United
States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 393-94 (Chase, J.); Paust, Judicial Power,
supra note 25, at 520-26; infra notes 53, 128.
45. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2735.
46. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
47. Id. at 2641.
48. Id. (citing law of war provisions and quoting Paust, Judicial Power, su-
pra note 25, at 510-11). In the cited writing, I also demonstrated why the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, contains several express rights of
individuals, contains implied rights, and is mostly self-executing. See, e.g.,
Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 515-16. See also In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 478-79 (D.D.C. 2005); Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush,
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.
2d 541, 553-54 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794,
797-99 (S.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997); but see Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd on other gds. sub
nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450,
468 (4th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other gds., 124 S. Ct. 2633.
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stan had still involved "[a]ctive combat operations against
Taliban fighters."49
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, dis-
agreed with the conclusion that law of war powers to detain
were implicitly infused within the congressional authoriza-
tion or were within the president's power as Commander in
Chief in the face of a federal statute prohibiting detention of
any citizen "except pursuant to an Act of Congress,"5 ° at least
where "the Government has not made out a case on any
[such] theory."5' Moreover, Justice Souter made the valid
49. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2642.
50. The Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). Concerning con-
gressional power to set limits on presidential war powers, see for example
Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558, 572 (1912) ("It was there decided that
the military commander at New Orleans 'had power to do all that the laws of
war permitted, except so far as he was restrained by ... the effect of congres-
sional action."') (quoting Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483,
495 (1873)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); Gelston
v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 330-38 (1818); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S.
(8 Cranch) 110, 125-29 (1814); Little v. Barreme (The Flying Fish), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28, 41
(1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-42 (1800); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344
F. Supp. 2d 152, 157-66 (D.D.C. 2004); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 516,. 518-19 (1860);
PAUST, supra note 9, at 461-62, 474-75 n.54, 478 n.58. More generally, Con-
gress has its share of the foreign affairs power. See generally LOUIs HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 64-80 (2d ed. 1996). Relevant
also is Justice Scalia's healthy "mistrust of military power permanently at the
Executive's disposal" and reaffirmation of the need for judicial protection of
"freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive." Hamdi,
124 S. Ct. at 2661, 2668 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He is correct that the fact that
"captivity may be consistent with the principles of international law does not
prove that it also complies with the restrictions that the Constitution places" on
executive power. See id. at 2671 n.5. Nonetheless, precisely because the presi-
dent is bound faithfully to execute international law, see infra note 53, presiden-
tial power can be enhanced by international law. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9,
at 9, 16, 44-47, 79, 82, 88, 180, 185, 457, 468-69, 480-81. Yet, as a matter of
domestic primacy, both congressional and international legal authorizations or
competencies are subservient to the requirements of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); PAUST, supra note 9, at 99, 101, 116-18,
120-21, 123-24 n.1, and the many cases cited.
51. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justice Scalia agreed that the statute does not authorize "de-
tention of a citizen with the clarity necessary." See id. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). See also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "En-
emy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1567, 1568, 1580, 1585-86, 1589, 1593 (2004).
The Executive had alleged that Hamdi "took up arms with the Taliban
during" the war in Afghanistan. 124 S. Ct. at 2635; see also id. at 2642 n.1
("Hamdi was carrying a weapon against American troops on a foreign battle-
field"). Justice O'Connor also argued that those "associated with the September
838 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Vol: 45
point that an implied congressional authorization to detain in
accordance with the laws of war would bring with it other
limitations under the laws of war, such as the obligation to
treat Hamdi and members of the Taliban as prisoners of war
until a competent tribunal determines their status 2  That
the president and every member of the executive branch are
bound by the law of war has been well understood since the
11, 2001 terrorist attacks" included those "who fought against the United States
in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported
the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks." 124 S. Ct. at
2640; see also id. at 2642 (stating that "individuals legitimately determined to
be Taliban combatants who 'engaged in armed conflict against the United
States" are also covered). However, the congressional authorization in the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, § 2(a) (Sept. 18, 2001), ap-
pears to be far more restrictive. With respect to persons, Congress merely au-
thorized "necessary and appropriate force" against those "nations,
organizations, or persons" that "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the
9/11 terrorist attacks as such or that "harbored such...persons." Id. It does not
authorize "force" against persons who were merely "associated" with the 9/11
attacks, much less those persons who were merely fighting with a de facto gov-
ernment that had "supported" al Qaeda more generally. In particular, there
was no clear proof that Mr. Hamdi had "aided" the 9/11 attacks or "harbored"
those who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 9/11 attacks as such. If
the Taliban "organization" had "harbored" al Qaeda, it is not clear that an au-
thorization to use force against the Taliban "organization" as such extends to
persons who are merely members of the Taliban, and it would not extend to a
person who merely "took up arms with the Taliban." These points are relevant
to inquiry whether others detained at Guantanamo actually fit within the lan-
guage of the congressional authorization. It can be noted, for example, that the
statement in Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005), that the au-
thorization. reaches anyone who "posed a threat of future terrorist attacks" (355
F. Supp. 2d at 315) is clearly incorrect. Moreover, Justice O'Connor stated that
the majority's interpretation of the congressional grant of authority to detain
was "based on longstanding law-of-war principles." 124 S. Ct. at 2641. Thus,
when persons have been captured and detained outside the theater of war or a
war-related occupation in Afghanistan or Iraq in circumstances where the laws
of war do not apply, the expanded interpretation of the congressional authoriza-
tion might be doubly doubtful. Additionally, the laws of war necessarily would
not provide executive authority to detain a person to whom the laws of war do
not apply. Importantly, the U.S. cannot be at "war" with al Qaeda as such be-
cause it is not an insurgent, belligerent, nation, or state. See, e.g., Paust, Judi-
cial Power, supra note 25, at 513 n.30. Similarly, the laws of war do not protect
them or authorize their detention outside an actual theater of war or war-
related occupied territory, unless a particular person is engaged in belligerent
acts in direct support of a party to an armed conflict in, for example, Afghani-
stan or Iraq. The ICCPR prohibits "arbitrary" detention (International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]), but it does not grant a power to detain persons when such
detention is not "arbitrary." Moreover, the ICCPR requires that detention be
"on.. .grounds and in accordance with procedures.. .established by law." Id.
52. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2657-58.
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Founding.53 Without ruling on whether the Executive "is in
53. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 (assuring in the text and structure of
the Constitution that the president is constitutionally bound to faithfully exe-
cute the "Laws"); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 231 (1901); The
Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453, 464 (1903); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
698 ("law of war"), 700, 708, 711, 714 (1900); Herrera, 222 U.S. at 572-73 (quot-
ing Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 495, but adding: "if it
was done in violation of the laws of war ... it was done in wrong."); New Or-
leans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 394 (1874) (limits "in the laws
and usages of war"); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 314-16
(1870) (Field, J., dissenting); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667-68, 671
(1863) (finding that the president is "bound to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed," including in context the "laws of war," "jure belli"); Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 149, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting);
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.); Bas v. Tingy,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-300 (1865);
PAUST, supra note 9, at 7-9, 67-70, 169-73, 175, 488-89, 493-94, (describing sup-
port from numerous cases, attorney general opinions, and unanimous views of
the Founders and the Framers); Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 514,
517-22; Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for
the United States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 981 (1994) (demonstrating why The Paquete
Habana allows no exception and recognizes the venerable power of the judiciary
to control the interpretation of customary international law and rule that Ex-
ecutive military conduct abroad during war against enemy aliens and their ves-
sels is illegal in violation of the laws of war); see also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("[Olperations of the nation in
["foreign"] territory must be governed by treaties ... [as well as] the principles
of international law."); United States v. Adams, 74 U.S. 463 (1869) (argument of
counsel: "The war powers of Congress and of the President, as Commander-in-
Chief... , and (as a necessary consequence) of his subordinate commanding
generals ... , are unlimited in time of war, except by the law of war."); Mitchell
v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134-35, 137 (1852) (holding that illegal or-
ders provide no defense); Ex parte Duncan, 153 F.2d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 1946)
(Stephens, J., dissenting) ("[The commander's] will is law subject only to the ap-
plication of the laws of war."); United States v. Am. Gold Coin, 24 F. Cas. 780,
782 (C.C.D. Mo. 1868) (No. 14,439) (showing it became necessary for the na-
tional government to take every possible measure against an enemy "and at the
same time [to do so] consistent with the laws of war"); Elgee's Adm'r v. Lovell, 8
F. Cas. 449, 454 (C.C.D. Mo. 1865) (No. 4,344) (Miller, J., on circuit) (concerning
the "law of nations,... no proclamation of the president can change or modify
this law"); United States ex rel. Henderson v. Wright, 28 F. Cas. 796, 798
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1863) (No. 16,777) (explaining that a war cartel is like a treaty
and "[u]nder the law of nations the president could not [engage in particular
conduct], and what the president of the United States cannot do, will not be as-
sumed by the judiciary"); Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 863
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7,417) (holding courts cannot construe Executive orders
so as to abrogate a right under the law of war); Dias v. The Revenge, 7 F. Cas.
637, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 3,877) (Washington, J., on circuit) (concerning
improper conduct under the laws of war, the owner of a privateer cannot "shield
himself, by saying that the privateer.., acts under the president's instruc-
tions"); Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Co.
(In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.), 2005 WL 729177, at *85 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 365, 369 (1857) (re: jus beti, "[t]he commander of the
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fact violating the Geneva Convention [Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War]' and is thus acting outside the cus-
tomary usages of war,"5 Justice Souter declared the govern-
ment's conduct to be "apparently at odds with its claim ... to
be acting in accordance with customary law of war and hence
to be within" the congressional use of force authorization. 6
invading, occupying, or conquering army, rules ... with supreme power, limited
only by international law, and the orders of the sovereign or government");
State ex rel. Tod v. Court of Common Pleas, 15 Ohio St. 377, 389-91 (1864)
There is no limitation placed upon this grant of the power to carry on
war, except those contained in the laws of war .... If a party brings a
suit against the president, or any one of his subordinates,... do not
questions at once arise, of the extent and lawfulness of the power exer-
cised, and of the right to shield the subaltern acting under orders, and
hold his superior alone responsible? And are not these constitutional
questions? If so, then, the case is one 'arising under the constitution'
[appropriate for federal courts] .... The controversy is merely as to
the occasions and manner of its exercise, and as to the parties who
should be held responsible for its abuse. In time of war .... he pos-
sesses and exercises such powers, not in spite of the constitution and
laws of the United States, or in derogation from their authority, but in
virtue thereof and in strict subordination thereto .... And in time of
war, without any special legislation, not the commander-in-chief only,
but every commander.., is lawfully empowered by the constitution
and laws of the United States to do whatever is necessary, and is sanc-
tioned by the laws of war .... The president is responsible for the
abuse of this power. He is responsible civilly and criminally ....
Id. In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359, 392 (1863) ("His duty is still only to execute the
laws, by the modes which the laws themselves prescribe; to wage the war by
employing the military power according to the laws of war."); id. at 395 ("Within
those limits let the war power rage, controlled by nothing but the laws of war.");
Ward v. Broadwell, 1 N.M. 75, 79 (1854) (quoting President Polk: "'The power to
declare war against a foreign country, and to prosecute it according to the laws
of war,... exists under our constitution. When congress has declared that war
exists with a foreign nation, the laws of war apply... and it becomes the duty of
the president ... to prosecute it;" (citing the Message of the President of July
24, 1848, Exec. Doc. No. 70)); see, e.g., infra note 128 (finding that the president
is also bound by other forms of international law). Moreover, judicial power
clearly exists to review the legality of executive decisions and actions in time of
war in the face of executive views to the contrary, and the laws of war are
clearly judicially enforceable. See, e.g., cases cited in this footnote; PAUST, su-
pra note 9, at 170-73, 175, 488-90, 493-94; Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25,
at 514, 518-24; see cases cited supra note 25. See also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650
("[In times of conflict,... [the Constitution] most assuredly envisions a role for
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."); Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
54. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
55. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
56. Id. at 2657. See also id. at 2660 (recognizing that there was an "absence
of... a showing that the detention conforms to the laws of war").
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This roundabout use of the laws of war may seem appropriate
in terms of normal judicial caution, but when a judge realizes
that every violation of the laws of war is a war crime57 and
war crime activity by the Executive against a habeas peti-
tioner who is before the Court is apparent, such caution in the
face of international crime is less than satisfying. The Court
should have mandated that the Executive comply with par-
ticular laws of war when it was apparent that they were be-
ing violated.
The holding in Hamdi rested primarily on Hamdi's due
process rights under the U.S. Constitution, and Justice
O'Connor rightly concluded that "due process demands that a
citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis
for that detention before a neutral decision maker."58 Fun-
damental human rights law and the laws of war also require
judicial review of the propriety of the detention of any human
being.59 Justice O'Connor's opinion, which was based on con-
stitutional due process, did not reach the point that treaty
law guarantees "similar access to a tribunal for a determina-
tion of his status,"" but, as noted, human rights dnd law of
war treaties do require such access.
IV. ALTMANN'S AVOIDANCE
Ruling on the narrow ground that the Foreign Sovereign
57. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land War-
fare 178, 498-99 (1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]; Jordan J. Paust, M. Cherif
Bassiouni, et al., International Criminal Law, 32, 803, 807 n.5, 821, 829, 831 (2d
ed. 2000); Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in
International Criminal Law 223 passim (2d ed. 1999); Principles of the Nurem-
berg Charter and Judgment, Principle VI b, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 12, at 11,
99, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1966).
58. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635; see also id. at 2648-49 (The detainee "must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker," "'a
neutral and detached judge in the first instance,'" (quoting Ward v. Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)) "'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner,'" (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 470 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)), and
"[tihese essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.").
59. See, e.g., Paust, Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 507-10, 514.
60. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 n.2. In other contexts, international law has
been used to inform the meaning of various constitutional amendments. See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 9, 12, 43-44 n.53, 200-01, 205, 212, 218-21, 248
n.92, 275-76 n.392, 324-26.
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Immunities Act ("FSIA")6' applies retroactively to provide ju-
risdiction with respect to claims brought to recover artwork
allegedly confiscated by the Nazi regime in violation of inter-
national law, the majority opinion of Justice Stevens in Re-
public of Austria v. Altmann62 understandably neglected cer-
tain historic judicial recognitions and left aside two important
issues. The first was whether confiscation of property or theft
during war are violations of international law covered by an
express exception to immunity in section 1605(a)(3) of the
FSIA.63  The second was whether the act of state doctrine
should apply to confiscation or war-time thievery in violation
of international law.6 In this respect, the Court missed an
opportunity to reaffirm important international legal pre-
cepts, although it might revisit this or similar cases in the fu-
ture.
First, confiscation of property is a violation of interna-
tional law unless it is necessary during war and consistent
with the -laws of war.65  Pillage or war-time thievery is also
proscribed.6 Second, in 1822, the Supreme Court provided an
61. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
62. 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004).
63. See id. at 2254.
64. See id. at 2254-55.
65. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421
n.21 (1964); Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215, 219 (1926) (argu-
ment of counsel); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 229 (1796) (Chase, J.);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, Whitlock & Co., 383 F.2d 166, 170-72 (2d Cir.
1967); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-52 (2d Cir.
1965). See, e.g., O'Neill v. Cent. Leather Co., 94 A. 789 (N.J. 1915) (concerning
confiscation during war); Hawkins v. Nelson, 40 Ala. 553, 556 (1867) (explaining
that "confiscation" is different than "expropriation," the latter involving at least
some attempt at payment of some amount for property taken).
66. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Law and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, arts. 28 ("pillage"), 46 ("[P]rivate property
... must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated."), 47 ("Pillage is
formally forbidden."), 56 ("All seizure of, destruction or willful damage to...
works of art . .. is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceed-
ings."), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; FM 27-10, supra note 57, at 21, 47, 24,
59; 1919 List of War Crimes adopted by the Responsibilities Commission of the
Paris Peace Conference, Nos. 13 (pillage), 14 (confiscation of property), reprinted
in PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 57, at 32, 33;
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 958, 965-69, 974 (9th Cir. 2002);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300; 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y.
1966); Branner v. Felkner, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk) 228, 231-35 (1870); Terrill v.
Rankin, 65 Ky. 453, 456, 460 (1867). Germany had refused to ratify the Hague
Convention by the time of World War II, but the International Military Tribu-
2005 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE COURT
important recognition that if a foreign sovereign violates in-
ternational law and "comes personally within our limits, al-
though he generally enjoys a personal immunity, he may be-
come liable to judicial process, in the same way, and under
the same circumstances, as the public ships of the nation,"
which then only enjoyed immunity as a matter of "public com-
ity and convenience, and... [a] presumed consent... [that]
may be withdrawn, upon notice, at any time," and that "in-
volves no pledge, that if illegally captured [in violation of the
law of nations] they shall be exempted."67 In a 1917 case pre-
senting nearly the same issues, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its earlier decision and recognized that "an illegal cap-
ture [of property] would be invested with the character of a
tort"68 and that alien plaintiffs were allowed to sue for restitu-
tion "conformably to the laws of nations and the treaties and
laws of the United States" for the German government's vio-
lation of customary international law and treaty law.69 In
that case, the Court recognized jurisdiction and the right to a
remedy despite the intervention of the German ambassador
and other foreign affairs concerns, the claim that the U.S.
court lacked jurisdiction, and the claim that since other pro-
ceedings had been instituted in Germany, the U.S. court
should decline jurisdiction. ° With respect to the act of state
doctrine more generally, it should only be considered with re-
nal at Nuremberg recognized that it had become customary international law by
1939 and that, as customary law, the rights, duties and prohibitions reflected
therein were universally applicable despite Germany's refusal and treaty-based
limitations in a general participation clause limiting application of the treaty to
war among signatories. See Opinion and Judgment, International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg (1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947).
67. See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822) (Mar-
shall, C.J.). The presumed or implied consent was also recognizably withdrawn
when the ship engaged in commercial activities. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 337-38
(1820); see also United States v. Wilder, 28 F. Cas. 601, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838)
(No. 16,694) (quoting EMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS II, § 213
(1758) ("[A]ll the private contracts of the sovereign, are naturally subject to the
same rules as those of private persons.")); Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.)
77, 78 (Common Pleas, Phila. 1781) (argument of counsel).
68. Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. (The Steamship Ap-
pam), 243 U.S. 124, 154 (1917).
69. Id. at 154. See also id. at 153-56. See also PAUST, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra note 25, at 575.
70. See The Steamship Appam, 243 U.S. at 147, 152, 156. See also The Pe-
terhoff, 72 U.S. 28, 57 (1866) ("[W]e administer the public law of nations, and
are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular ... disadvantage of our
own or another country").
843
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
spect to lawful "public" acts of a foreign state and must not
provide a mantel of protection for violations of international
law, since such acts are ultra vires and are not lawfully pro-
tectable under international law.71
V. HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE's HALLUCINATIONS
The sane and sacrosanct rule of construction recognized
by Chief Justice Marshall is found in F. Hoffman-La Roche v.
Empagran: federal statutes "'ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.' 73 Marshall added an important supplement to the
rule that assures the primacy of rights under customary in-
ternational law when he affirmed that federal statutes "can
never be construed to violate... rights... further than is
warranted by the law of nations."74 Additionally, it is well-
known that international law limits the reach of U.S. jurisdic-
tional competencies and, as law of the United States, such
limits can bind the judiciary." Surprisingly however, in com-
71. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE
U.S., supra note 25, at 573-76, 628, 686, 706-11; Opinion and Judgment, supra
note 66 (Regarding an "act of state," such a principle "cannot be applied to acts
which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these
acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position," and one "cannot
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the
state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under international
law."), reprinted in 41 AM. J. IN'L L. 172, 221 (1947); Altmann, 317 F.3d at 968;
West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) ("viola-
tions of international law are not 'sovereign' acts"); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp.
207, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1993); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 725, 726 (1835) (noting that Vattel
had recognized that a foreign consul has no immunity if "he violate[s] the law of
nations"); Jordan J. Paust, Tolerance in the Age of Increased Interdependence,
56 FLA. L. REV. 987, 998-1000 (2004); Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators
of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 242-47 (1983). The material cited above demonstrates that the ul-
tra vires principle also allows recognition that acts of government actors in vio-
lation of international law are not acts taken within the scope of lawful "public"
or "official" authority.
72. F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
73. Id. at 2366 (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.)). See also Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
2686, 2698 n.15 (2004).
74. Murray, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (emphasis added). See, e.g., PAUST,
supra note 9, at 144 (concerning this important recognition).
75. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-22 (1933); Ford v.
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927); United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas.
754, 759-60 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 14,918); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
Vol: 45
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bination with these venerable rules the opinion in F. Hoff-
man-La Roche contains an erroneous notion that a principle
of "reasonableness" concerning the reach of U.S. extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction that is proclaimed in section 403 of the Re-
statement76 has anything to do with customary international
law based in real-world patterns of generally shared expecta-
tion and practice.
Justice Breyer's majority opinion stated that the Court
"ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreason-
able interference with the sovereign authority of other na-
tions," but cited only three cases in support of this broad as-
sertion, and they involved the unique circumstance of
activities on foreign flag vessels.77 Thereafter, Justice Breyer
accepted a false notion that Justice Scalia previously could
only set forth in dissent, that section 403 of the Restatement
"reflects principles of customary international law.""5 How-
ever, as noted elsewhere: T
The Restatement's alleged rule of "reasonableness," pre-
ferring an ad hoc "balancing" of factors or contacts ap-
proach that might function to limit federal jurisdiction,
has not generally been followed by U.S. courts, especially
if jurisdiction is possible under the protective or national-
ity principles. In fact, the alleged "rule" is not a require-
ment of international law, nor is it a reflection of general
practice in the U.S. or abroad. It is a controversial asser-
tion based on "comity" or "choice of law" theory (which is
not customary international law or treaty law)79 and would
operate as a self-denying limit on jurisdictional competen-
cies that pertain under international law .... The U.S.
Supreme Court offered criticism of such an approach in
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
Supp. 896, 906 (D.D.C. 1988); PAUST, supra note 9, at 415-16; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 33, § 431(1) & cmt. a.
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 403.
77. F. Hoffman, 124 S. Ct. at 2366, (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963); Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
578 (1953)). But see Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); Societe Nation-
ale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); supra text ac-
companying note 70.
78. F. Hoffman, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509
U.S. at 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 814-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the theory is one of mere "comity" or "choice-of-law theory,"
but thereafter improperly confusing such theories with "international law").
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ras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) ("Application of the sanctions of
the Act... on a purely ad hoc weighing of contacts basis
... would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign af-
fairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice") .... If
used, what weight should be given to what factors? What
if there are combinations of prescriptive jurisdictional
competence for the forum state? Wouldn't such an ap-
proach be haphazard, inflexible and "unreasonable" con-
cerning policies at stake, and unpredictable, leaving oth-
ers without adequate guidance or notice whether
jurisdiction might be exercised?"'
Additionally, the so-called "reasonableness" principle has
no application when U.S. jurisdiction rests on universal juris-
diction," a point that Justice Breyer recognized obliquely in
another case when stating that "universal jurisdiction... is
consistent with.. . comity."82 Moreover, "Congress has also
generally ignored a comity-factors approach to jurisdiction,"'
80. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra
note 25, at 441-42. In fact, I know of no federal case obviating jurisdiction un-
der such a c-0mity-factors theory when U.S. jurisdiction rests on either the pro-
tective or nationality principle. It would not apply when universal jurisdiction
pertains and, in view of the importance of providing criminal and civil sanctions
for violations of customary international law that implicate universal jurisdic-
tion, clearly it should not. See also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
184, 197 (1820) (explaining piracy "is against all, and punished by all... within
this universal jurisdiction"); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-61 (1795)
("[Aill ... trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are enquir-
able, and may be proceeded against, in any nation where no special exemption
can be maintained, either by the general law of nations, or by some treaty which
forbids or restrains it .... [Such] is not merely an offence against the nation of
the individual committing the injury, but also against the law of nations, and, of
course, cognizable in other countries . . . ."); Dole v. New England Mut. Marine
Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3,966) (holding piracy "may
be tried and punished in the courts of justice of any nation by whomsoever and
wheresoever committed"); PAUST, supra note 9, at 420-23, 440-41 n.76, 443-48.
81. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra
note 25, at 445; RESTATEMENT, supra note 33, § 404 & cmt. a ("[I]nternational
law permits any state to apply its law to punish certain offenses although the
state has no links of territory with the offense .... "); supra note 80.
82. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2783 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part). However, Justice Breyer seemed to miss the point that
ATCA suits involve universal jurisdiction because they necessarily rest on viola-
tions of international law. Compare id. at 2782 ("comity concerns ... do arise"
regarding "a claim that a certain kind of foreign conduct violates an interna-
tional norm") with PAUST, supra note 9, at 421-23; see also cases cited supra
notes 67-71, 80.
83. See PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., su-
pra note 25, at 445.
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and the Supreme Court has ignored it in-the past.' Also, for-
eign court practice is generally to retain jurisdiction permit-
ted by international law,"5 and the political branches should
decide whether to give or trade away jurisdictional competen-
cies that exist under international law.86 Further, it is pecu-
liar to pretend that Congress had such a comity theory in
mind when enacting legislation and then to deny the very
reach of legislation that it chose.87
Even stranger, Justice Scalia's concurrence offered a
newly created, but allegedly "customary," "principle" that is
clear anathema to international law and seemingly would
have provided comfort to the Nazi regime in Germany.88 As
Justice Scalia prefers, "statutes should be read in accord with
the customary deference to the application of foreign coun-
tries' laws within their own territories."8 With respect to vio-
lations of international law, Justice Scalia's view might not be
so bad, however, since there is no customary deference to for-
eign state laws that are violative of international law and,
with respect to international crime in particular, domestic
law clearly is no excuse."° Additionally, there is no customary
deference when jurisdiction is based on the nationality or pro-
tective principles.9'
84. See id. at 444.
85. See id. at 442.
86. Id. at 442-45.
87. See F. Hoffman, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (stating that the comity theory "cau-
tions courts to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign
interests of other nations when they write American laws").
88. See, e.g., Opinion and Judgment, supra notes 66, 71; infra note 90 (do-
mestic law is no excuse).
89. See F. Hoffman, 124 S. Ct. at 2373 (Scalia; J., concurring) (offering no
citations). And why should activist judges in our, democracy "read" out of a
statute the reach that Congress chose with nothing tnore than a slot-machine ad
hoc "comity" balancing approach to a decision that Congress has not sanctified,
is not generally required by treaty, and is not actually based in customary in-
ternational law?
90. See, e.g., United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1821) (No. 15,551); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1859); Principles of the
Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, supra note 57, Principle II; PAUST, supra
note 9, at 99, 126-27, 153-54, 306-08, 422, 435-38, 445, 451 n.17; supra note 71.
91. The nationality principle permits jurisdiction to prescribe extraterrito-
rial laws reaching the prescribing state's nationals anywhere in the universe.
The protective principle allows prescriptive competence with respect to extra-
territorial conduct that poses significant national security threats and if it is not
otherwise impermissible under international law to exercise jurisdiction. See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 416, 419-20.
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VI. SOSA'S SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain9 is among the more disappoint-
ing decisions of the Court. Perhaps partly because of the fo-
cus of and limited space allowed for some of the amici briefs
in the case, the majority opinion of Justice Souter missed a
far richer legal history relevant to: (1) whether the ATCA cre-
ates a cause of action93 (since other than a highly criticized
concurrence by former Judge Bork,94 the Sosa opinion was the
first in over 200 years of judicial history to rule that it does
not),95 and (2) the types of infractions of both treaties and the
customary law of nations by public and private actors that
were known to the Founders, Framers, and early judiciary.96
97A 1781 Resolution of the Continental Congress was men-
tioned, but its actual reach was not fully appreciated. Justice
Souter recognized that it addressed breaches of neutrality
(therein termed "'acts of hostility') and all "'infractions of
treaties,"'9 8 but he overlooked the point expressed in the 1781
Resolution that some of the listed infractions of the custom-
ary laws of nations were only those "offences against [the] law
[of nations]"99 which are most obvious and, therefore, that the
list was inclusive and not exclusive. By focusing elsewhere in
his opinion merely on Blackstone's list, which did not ex-
pressly include breaches of neutrality and all infractions of
treaties, Justice Souter seemed to forget the types of infrac-
tions recognized by the Continental Congress and, in any
event, missed other types of international law known to the
92. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 253-55 & n.11 (2004).
94. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring). History and the weight of judicial opinion were
completely to the contrary, and there were several other errors in Judge Bork's
opinion. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 93. Indeed, if the ATCA had been merely
jurisdictional, what would have been its purpose given the precursor to 28
U.S.C. § 1331?
95. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
96. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 11-12, 59-61 nn.76-104, 195-203, 208-
09 (including human rights, denials of justice, laws of war or war crimes,
breaches of neutrality, and various other international crimes and infractions);
Paust, supra note 93, at 250-52 n.3, 255-56 & n.13.
97. Resolution of 1781, 21 J. CONT. CONG. 1136-37, reprinted in PAUST, ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra note 25, at 23-24.
98. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756-57, 2759 (quoting the 1781 Resolution, su-
pra note 97).
99. Id. at 2759.
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early judiciary.' ° More specifically, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized early in our history, among other pertinent points,
that "all ... trespasses committed against the general law of
nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any
nation;"1 ' that our judicial tribunals "are established.., to
decide on human rights;" 2 that confiscation of property is a
violation of the law of nations; 3 and that our tribunals must
address the laws of war."°  Other early federal cases and
opinions of the attorneys general addressed these and other
subjects.0 5 Clearly, with respect to ATCA litigation after
Sosa, that history should be revisited. Today, the types of
violations implicating responsibility have expanded.' 6 As
'100. Compare Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756, 2759 (assuming in error that the "law
appears to have understood only those three," even though the 1781 Resolution
obviously listed two more: (1) breaches of neutrality, and (2) all infractions of
treaties). Moreover, Blackstone had expressly referred to the "rights of man"
and "rights of mankind," phrases covering what were also termed human rights.
See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 196, 242 n.19.
101. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-61 (1795) (Iredell, J.). The
Court thereby also recognized universal jurisdiction for all such trespasses. See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 421-22.
102. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.)); see
also The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting) ("rights
of humanity" in time of war); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 421
(counsel referring to "human rights"), 478 ("rights of men") (1793) (Jay, C.J.);
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (Paterson, J.)
("rights of man"); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No.
6,360) (Wilson, J., with Iredell, J., on circuit, and Judge Peters) ("rights of
man"); supra note 96 (concerning views of the Founders and the Framers). See,
e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 210-23 (concerning later attention to human rights
precepts in thousands of federal and state cases).
103. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227, 229 (1796) (Chase, J.).
104. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 149, 153
(1814) (Story, J., dissenting); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28, 39
(1801) (Marshall, C.J.); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (Chase, J.);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 279 (Iredell, J.); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) ("From the very beginning of its history this Court has rec-
ognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy
nations as well as enemy individuals."); PAUST, supra note 9, at 227; Paust, Bas-
siouni, et al., supra note 57, at 278-80 (early attention to the law of war); Paust,
Judicial Power, supra note 25, at 516 n.45; see supra notes 53, 66 and accompa-
nying text.
105. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 12, 371, 376-77, 395; Jordan J. Paust,
The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Le-
gal Process, 25 MICH. J. INTL L. 1229 (2004); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights
Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNA'L L. 801 (2002).
Sosa's general attention to early types of violations does not preclude use of
modern international law. See, e.g., Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62, 2766. Indeed,
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Justice Breyer recognized in Sosa, in addition to war crimes,
violations implicating responsibility now include "torture,
genocide, [and] crimes against humanity." °7
Further, in view of misstatements about the relevance of
the "law merchant" and "admiralty" law,0 8 which had long
been separated from customary international law as such,0 9 it
is a mystery what the Court had in mind when considering an
early Opinion of the Attorney General addressing crimes and
civilly sanctionable breaches of neutrality on land on the west
coast of Africa. The early opinion expressly recognized that
the conduct of private U.S. actors, "being in violation of a
treaty" and against the customary law of nations, triggered
civil liability under the ATCA and that "the company or indi-
viduals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have
a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States," or
what we might term today, a cause of action."0 The interna-
tional crime of breaches of neutrality was also addressed two
years earlier in the famous Henfield's Case"' by Chief Justice
Jay, Justice Wilson, Justice Iredell, and Judge Peters, who
use of modern international law is preferable and required. See, e.g., Ware, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 281 ("When the United States declared their independence,
they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem state of purity and
refinement."); Paust, supra note 93, at 259-60 & n.26.
107. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
108. See id. at 2756. Justice Souter did not realize that The Paquete Habana
involved a violation of the law of war. Compare supra note 53; The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. at 698 ("law of war"). See also supra note 104. Further, there is
a difference between admiralty jurisdiction and admiralty law. See W.B. v.
Latimer, 4 U.S. 1, 21-22 (Ct. of Errors and Apps., Del. 1788) ("[P]rizes are ac-
quisitions jure belli, andjus belli is to be determined by the law of nations, and
not by the particular municipal laws of any country.").
109. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 42-43 n.50; Jordan J. Paust, Customary
International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of the United States, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 308-09 (1999).
110. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). The Attorney General's opinion is ad-
dressed only in part in Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2759. The relevant jurisdiction was
not admiralty jurisdiction and the relevant law was clearly not admiralty or
maritime law, but treaty law and the customary law of nations. See, e.g., Paust,
supra note 93, at 250-51 n.3, 254-55 n.11 (concerning other early cases and a
1907 Opinion of the Attorney General relevant to whether the ATCA created a
cause of action); Paust, Private Corporations, supra note 106, at 823-24 n.111
(regarding the treaties addressed in the 1795 and 1907 opinions of the attorneys
general, which did not expressly create a cause of action).
111. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Jay, C.J.,
Wilson, J., Iredell, J., and Judge Peters) (regarding charges to grand juries).
See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 12, 59 n.78, 60 n.84.
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had also been concerned about the need for criminal and civil
sanctions"' and who did not address the directly incorporable
violation of the law of nations as a violation of "common law,"
but as an offense against the "laws of the United States.""'
Indeed, customary international law was not mere "common
law" or limited to or by "common law,""' and cases like Erie v.
Tompkins"' did not address, and had nothing to do with, in-
ternational law."6 It is strange, therefore, why Justice Souter
assumed in error and without evident need that customary
international law is some sort of common law.17 It is likely
that he had been misled."8
112. See, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108 (Wilson, J.); Paust, supra
note 94, at 255 n.13.
113. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1101, 1103-04, 1112, 1115. The "laws of
the United States" directly include customary international law. See, e.g., id. at
1101; PAUST, supra note 9, at 7-8, 10, 38 n.36, 44 n.54, 50 n.60; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 33, § 111 & cmt. e, reporters' note 4.
114. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 9, 39-43 n.50 (and the many cases cited
therein); Paust, supra note 109, at 301-05, 308-10; Paust, note 93, at 265 n.35.
Moreover, unlike mere federal common law, international law is not made by
U.S. courts, but is created by an international legal process in which numerous
actors participate.
115. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
116. See supra notes 114-15.
117. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761-62, 2764-65 (2004);
see also Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2770-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
118. The mere "common law" error had been part of a shockingly ahistorical
trap created as part of an effort by a small, radically right-winged flock to ig-
nore directly relevant views of the Founders and Framers and overwhelming
trends in judicial opinions (especially concerning human rights) and to rewrite
200 years of judicial history. But the history they do not wish to conserve can-
not be swept away by a few (or many) professorial cantations and highly selec-
tive briefings by parroting activists that provide the sometime historic accuracy
of a check-out counter rag. Justice Scalia swallowed the trappings of the mere
"common law" error with ahistorical statements about the relevance of mere
"law merchant," unashamed misreadings of cases like Erie v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), and N.Y Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1876), and aston-
ishing misstatements about their supposed effect on the continued use of cus-
tomary international law in U.S. courts with no attention to numerous directly
relevant federal and state cases decided after 1876. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at
2770-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). But see id. at 2764-65); Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984) (O'Connor, J., opinion)
(relevant congressional-executive "arrangement" must not be "exercised in a
manner inconsistent with.., international law"); United States v. Maine, 475
U.S. 89, 93 (1986); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco para el Commercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623, 628-29 n.20 (1983); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-37 (1964); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942);
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922); United States v. Flores,
289 U.S. 137, 156-59 (1933); Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church,
210 U.S. 296, 318 (1908); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 231 (1901); The
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Finally, the Court was not briefed on the fact that the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 9
("ICCPR") is at the very least partly self-executing. 12' The
U.S. declaration of partial non-self-execution is expressly in-
applicable to Article 50 of the ICCPR,12' which mandates in
clear, unavoidable, and self-executing terms that all of "[t]he
provisions of the ... Covenant shall extend to all parts of fed-
eral States without any limitations or exceptions" 12  whatso-
ever. Further, the U.S. Understanding 3 upon ratification
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708, 711, 714 (1903); Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 326 (1889); Coffee v.
Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1887); United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 233
(1887); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Coleman v. Tenn., 97 U.S. 509,
517 (1878); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927); The Newfoundland, 89 F.
510, 512 (D.S.C. 1898); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1894); United
States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.D.C. 1988); PAUST, supra note 9, at 10-11, 56-59
nn.68-73, 116, 165-67 nn.134-135; Paust, supra note 109, at 301-15; see also su-
pra note 114. He fell off his perch and wallowed in the worst of it when parrot-
ing: "the law of nations ... was not supreme federal law that could displace
state law." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2773 n.* (emphasis deleted) (citing no relevant
federal or state cases). Consistent with the views of the Founders and Framers,
an overwhelming number of federal and state court opinions have recognized
that states are bound by customary international law or the "law of nations."
See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); Manchester v. Massa-
chusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 264 (1891); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 444; Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227-29 (Chase, J.); id. at 281 (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(universally obligatory customary law of nations); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (Jay, C.J.); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
297, 298 (Wilson, J.), 299 n.* (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220,
257 (Pa. 1810) ("The United States have always considered themselves bound
by the law of nations .... The nation which makes a penal municipal law, has
a right to direct the proceedings under it, in what manner it pleases, provided it
does not violate the law of nations."); PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra note 25, at 388-90, and federal and numerous
state cases cited; Paust, supra note 109, at 301-04, 306, 310 n.49, 311-15. These
cases alone play havoc with the radical ahistorical theory. See, e.g., id. at 309-
13.
119. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
120. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 9, at 78-79, 97 n.126, 361-62, 373; PAUST, ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S., supra note 25, at 75-76,
193-94; Paust, supra note 93, at 264 & n.33.
121. See ICCPR, supra note 119.
122. Id. at art. 50.
123. See CLAIBORNE DEBORDA PELL, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S.
REP. No. 102-23, at 18-22 (1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657-59 (1992); see
also sources cited supra note 120.
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and the Executive Explanation'24 concerning Article 50 dem-
onstrate the intent that the United States executive and judi-
ciary, among others, will comply with Article 50's mandate; 25
and the Executive Explanation also demonstrates that the
declaration has a special meaning that the treaty will not it-
self create a cause of action, but it does not preclude use of
the treaty defensively or as incorporated by reference through
statutes like the habeas statute and the ATCA.'26 Unfortu-
nately, and perhaps due to imperfect, limited briefing, Justice
Souter missed these critical points when stating in error that
the declaration of partial non-self-execution means that the
ICCPR does "not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts."'27 Because the Constitution also mandates
that the executive branch comply with and faithfully execute
treaty law of the United States 2 and expressly and unavoid-
ably requires that "all" treaties of the United States are su-
preme law of the land for supremacy purposes,"' such a
124. S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 123, at 18; see also sources cited supra
note 120.
125. See also S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 123, at 19; see also sources cited
supra note 120.
126. See supra notes 27, 120.
127. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767. Considering the Executive Explanation
noted above, he might have said "not itself create a cause of action."
128. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
606 (1927); Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 14 & n.12, 18 (1936); Francis v.
Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 240, 242 (1906); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890); Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 563 (1884); Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v.
Kibbee, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 415 (1840); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 594 (1832); United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,
110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796)
(Iredell, J.); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No.
13,799) (Curtis, J., on circuit), affd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862); United States
v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641-42 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase, J., on
circuit); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 569-71 (1822); PAUST, supra note 9, at 7-11, 169-
73, 488-89, 493-94; see cases cited supra note 53.
129. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "all" treaties of the
United States are supreme law); PAUST, supra note 9, at 67-69, 79-80, 115-16,
361-62, 380-81 nn.3-8. Additionally, the Tenth Amendment is no barrier and
assures supremacy of all treaties because the treaty power is expressly "dele-
gated to the United States" and "prohibited. . . to the States." See U.S. CONST.
amend. X; see also id. arts. I, § 10, II, § 2, VI, cl. 2 (promulgating presidential
authority to make treaties and prohibiting States from entering into such
agreements); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("[Tlhe people and the States
have delegated their [treaty] power to the National Government and the Tenth
Amendment is no barrier."); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("[B]y
Article II, § 2, ... [the treaty power] is delegated expressly, and by Article VI
treaties ... are declared the supreme law of the land."); United States v. Lue,
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statement should be revised. Moreover, the Constitution cre-
ates a judicial competence and responsibility to apply treaty
law.' In this symposium, some of my colleagues have ad-
dressed the Court's approach to whether arbitrary detention
is a violation of customary human rights law. I will simply
add two points. First, as Supreme Court and other cases
have demonstrated since the Founding, proof of the content of
customary international law rests on general (not universal)
patterns of legal expectation and behavior, and need not be
restrictive.' Second, whether the capture of persons in par-
ticular circumstances is "arbitrary" can depend upon context
and other legal policies at stake.'32
134 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the
federal government, whatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states:
the Tenth Amendment is not material") (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 191 (2d ed. 1996)); Common-
wealth v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. 56, 81 (1846) ("[T]he States are expressly prohib-
ited from entering into any treaty .... [T]he power of making ... treaties ... is
vested absolutely and exclusively in the general government, with their inci-
dents."). Moreover, since the treaty power is expressly among federal preroga-
tives and an exclusive federal power a so-called "federalism" inquiry would be
misplaced.
130. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under... Treaties made .... "); id. art. VI,
cl. 2 (stating that "all" treaties of the United States shall be the supreme law of
the land); see also PAUST, supra note 9, at 68-75, 78-79, 105, 129-32 nn.14-15,
189, 295, 361-62, 368-71 passim.
131. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) (noting a rule of
international law arising out of "general assent"); id. at 700-01, 708, 711 (ob-
serving the "general consent" test); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88
(1871) ("the law of the sea ... is of universal obligation .... Like all the laws of
nations, it rests upon the common consent... because it has been generally ac-
cepted" and has the force of law through the "common consent of mankind");
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) ("The law of nations ... is
founded on the common consent as well as the common sense of the world.");
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850) (noting counsel's argument that
such principles are established by the "common consent"); The Antelope, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 66, 119 (1825) (stating that the Court must look to "general,... and
admitted practice"); id. at 121 (using a test of "general consent" and "general
assent" of the world); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796) ("general
consent of mankind"); PAUST, supra note 9, at 3-6, 21-36 nn. 2-4, 11, 14, 17-25,
28 (demonstrating also that customary international law is universal law but
does not require universal patterns of expectation or behavior); Paust, supra
note 93, at 257-62, 265.
132. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain Abduction, Standing,
Denials of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 551, 563-66, 574 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Ter-
rorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 538-39
(2002). Sosa did not address issues concerning "the cross-border feature of...
abduction," focused on "detention of less than a day," and hinged inquiry on
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article has addressed the use and relevance of inter-
national law in six cases decided by the Supreme Court in
2004. It is evident that international law did not often form
the primary or an alternative basis for decisions. Sometimes
international law was viewed obliquely and sometimes its
relevance was supplemental to inquiry concerning the mean-
ing of constitutional or statutory provisions.
It is also evident that the rich history of judicial use of
customary and treaty-based international law for more than
200 years deserves far greater attention. Ahistorical errors in
briefs and oral arguments can mislead the Court. Sometimes,
it seems, lawyers intentionally mislead. Greater attention to
actual trends in judicial decisions and a full range of relevant
cases on particular issues should help. These may be lacking
in short briefs or intentionally hidden, but they are readily
discoverable by computer-assisted research and more thor-
ough attention to scholarly materials. For example, attention
to the rich history of proof of the content of customary inter-
national law allows avoidance of fundamentally false claims
that nonbinding instruments are irrelevant 133 or that custom-
ary international law must rest on universal consent.' An-
other point that is obvious when relevant cases are consulted
is that the president is not above the law and that during war
the president is bound by the laws of war."'
whether domestic law as such provided authorization for arrest. See Sosa, 124
S. Ct. at 2767-69 & n.24. Thus, other issues remain, such as those concerning
cross-border abductions and more lengthy detentions.
133. See Paust, supra note 93, at 259 n.25.
134. See id. at 259-61 & n.27.
135. See, e.g., supra notes 44-45, 53.
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